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Abstract—Development of a smarter electric grid necessitates
addressing the associated cyber security challenges. Since the
interdependence between the legacy grid infrastructure and
advanced information technology is growing rapidly, there are
numerous ways advanced, motivated, and persistent attackers can
affect the SCADA based critical infrastructure. Hence, developing
a security information and event management (SIEM) is crucial
for securing the SCADA power system. This paper presents the
application of Security Onion (SecOn) to develop the network
security monitoring (NSM) and intrusion detection system (IDS)
in the context of SCADA cyber physical security. Initially, we have
applied a cyber kill-chain model to demonstrate the different
stages of attacks and associated mechanisms. Later, the rule-
based IDS (RIDS) is developed using Snort IDS, and tested in
the cyber-physical SCADA environment. Furthermore, we have
evaluated its performance in terms of accuracy and detection
latency. Our experimental results reveal that the SecOn tool is
efficient in monitoring and detecting attacks within an acceptable
time frame with a high accuracy rate.
I. INTRODUCTION
Today’s power grid consists of a highly sophisticated,
complex network where numerous controllers are performing
several operations at the substation and control center levels
to maintain the stability and reliability of the power system. It
relies on the SCADA infrastructure for real-time monitoring,
logging, report generation and automated control. The SCADA
system is designed to stand up to the evolving grid given a
little attention to cyber physical security which has exposed
it to the multitude of vulnerabilities; and can be exploited by
a human or malicious software. On July 2018, the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security (DHS) has issued warning alerts
against international threat actors, who have constantly tar-
geted industrial control system (ICS) in the past [1]. Recently,
the published reports by Industrial Control Systems Cyber
Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT) discuss several cyber
security incidents that have targeted the SCADA ICS including
Stuxnet and the Ukraine’s grid hack [2]. Based on the cyber-
security surveys in [3], it was observed that the majority of
attacks have affected normal operation, attacks are happening
at different stages, the frequency of attacks has increased
with time; and attackers are adopting several methods like
social engineering, malware attacks, denial of service (DoS),
1Acknowledgement: This research is funded in part by NSF CPS and DOE
CEDS programs.
etc. to launch successful attacks. Given the complexity of
power grid network coupled with legacy infrastructures, it
is untrustworthy to rely on the information technology-based
conventional security measures. Therefore, there is a com-
pelling need to go beyond the conventional security measures,
and develop the defense-in-depth architecture to secure the
SCADA grid network. In order to develop the defense-in-
depth architecture, it is necessary to have the comprehensive
understanding of attack processes and mechanisms. The Cyber
Kill chain model was first introduced by Lockheed Martin
analysts Eric M. Hutchins, Michael J. Cloppert, and Rohan
M. Amin in 2011 [4]. It includes the sequence of stages
and processes that an attacker can deploy as stepping stones
to successfully execute a cyber-attack. Therefore, it assists
to better understand the end-to-end decision-making process
from an adversary’s perspective while engaging him to create
desired effects.
Log management is a next step towards developing the
defense-in-depth architecture for securing the critical infras-
tructure. It provides efficient and secure ways to manage
a network, while providing real-time situational awareness
to an operator. The NIST guide to Computer Security Log
Management [5] talks about the state-of-the-art SIEM software
and its capabilities to perform several functions such as log
storage, analysis, and monitoring. Because of its advanced
capabilities and extensive features, it is preferred over the
conventional log management software. The white paper by
the SANS Institute [6] discusses its applications, detection
processes, and also shows how to use it effectively with tradi-
tional network IDS against cyber security threats. Previously
published research works [7], [8] have discussed the growing
threats in the SCADA grid security, which provide a clear
motivation in applying the SIEM solution for the SCADA
network. However, there exist the limited substantial works
which show its application in the SCADA cyber-physical
environment. The paper in [9] proposes a novel framework
to address the incomplete alert information to develop an
efficient log management. In this paper, we have applied the
open source Security Onion (SecOn), as a SIEM tool, for
developing the Network System Monitoring (NSM) and rule-
based IDS (RIDS) for the SCADA cyber-physical security.
Specifically, we have followed the kill-chain model, which can
be utilized by an advanced persistent attacker (APA), to create
stealthy cyber-attacks on the power system. Later, the SecOn
tool is implemented, and experimentally tested in the cyber-978-1-7281-0407-2/19/$31.00 c©2019 IEEE
Fig. 1: Abstract level cyber kill chain model with attack processes and mechanisms.
physical environment by leveraging the resources available at
PowerCyber CPS security testbed at Iowa State University
(ISU). Finally, we have evaluated its performance in terms of
latency and accuracy for detecting different stages of attacks
in real-time.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORKS
In this section, we talk about the cyber kill chain model,
present related works; and discuss about the SIEM tool for
developing NSM and IDS.
A. Cyber Kill Chain
Figure 1 shows the abstract-level presentation of cyber kill
chain in the context of SCADA cyber-physical security. It
shows how an attacker can utilize tools, tactics, and procedures
(TTPs) in a sequence of steps to deploy a successful cyber
attack. Any disruption in the process/stage can break the
chain, and thus, it may interrupt the attacker’s objective of
destabilizing the grid. There are different versions of the model
which can be utilized based on the security requirements and
network configuration. We have adopted a simpler version of
the model as presented in [10]. The model consists of various
processes/stages, which are defined as:
1. Reconnaissance: In this stage, the attacker tries to collect
substantial and relevant information of targets to develop the
blueprint of network architecture. The attacker can perform
ping scanning, port scanning, service scanning, etc. as a scan
attack mechanism to complete this stage. Several scanning
tools like Ping Scanner, Nmap, Zenmap, etc. can be leveraged
to identify alive hosts, map network addresses; and figure out
the up-to-date network diagram and architecture.
2. Access and Exploitation: In this stage, the attacker
tries to communicate or connect to a target to discover the
potential vulnerabilities. Later, the obtained information about
the existing vulnerabilities can be exploited to gain a foothold
or the privilege escalation to launch the successful attack. The
vulnerability assessment or penetration testing can be used
as an attack mechanism; and tools like openVAS, Metasploit,
Nessus, etc. can be utilized to complete this stage.
3. Attack Launch/ Execution: Before reaching this stage,
the attacker must ensure that he has obtained the necessary
privileges to execute or launch different types of attacks. While
considering the possible attack surfaces in power system, an
attack can be performed on system measurements, control
signals, wide-area communication or operating field devices
to disrupt the grid stability.
4. Persistence: This is the final stage, where the attacker
creates an additional backdoor or access channel to maintain
his persistence access to the compromised system, which can
be exploited later for attack repetition or launching multiple
attacks in a coordinated fashion.
B. SIEM Tool: Security Onion
Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) is a
combination of security information management (SIM) and
security event management (SEM); and is widely deployed
to provide better security log management over the network.
It supports several sets of features to provide the real-time
comprehensive visibility of aggregated data, crucial opera-
tional alarms to detect anomalies, and event analysis based
on the aggregated logs. The paper published by the SANS
Institute [11] discusses the benefits of log management; and
shows how the security onion (SecOn) tool can be deployed in
developing the SIEM architecture. Security onion is an open
source, Linux based distribution system, which is deployed
for network security monitoring (NSM), intrusion detection
and prevention systems (IDPS). In general, the core functions
of SecOn can be classified into three categories: 1) Packet
Capturing and Monitoring, 2) Network and Host-based IDS,
and 3) Packet Analysis tools.
1) Network Security Monitoring (NSM): NSM is a core se-
curity professional skill required for the collection, detection,
log analysis, and escalation of indications and warnings to
detect and respond to intrusions at the early stage. Using the
network sensors, SecOn can monitor incoming and outgoing
network traffic, and, hence, it provides the bird’s eye view of
the network to the system operator. Different analysis tools
such as Sguil, Kibana and Squert can be utilized to monitor
and visualize the SCADA network.
2) Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS): NIDS
monitors and analyzes network traffic to detect the suspicious
pattern based on the assigned rules. The SecOn facilitates the
sophisticated intrusion detection system (IDS) by incorporat-
ing publicly available IDS tools like BRO, Suricata, and Snort
to detect different classes of anomalies in real-time. In this
paper, we have focused on Snort IDS; and different set of
rules are defined as well as implemented based on the kill-
Fig. 2: Flowchart showing SIEM architecture for cyber-kill chain model
chain model. Due to the space limitation, we are not providing
the detailed information about the Snort IDS.
III. SIEM ARCHITECTURE AND IMPLEMENTATION
Figure 2 shows the flowchart of SIEM architecture for
monitoring network packets, and detecting anomalies in real-
time using the SecOn tool. The wide-area network traffic is
sniffed through the SecOn, which is employed for the network
security monitoring (NSM) and network-based IDS (NIDS).
The NSM is performed based on the real-time packet analysis
and network configuration. Figure 3 (upper figure) shows the
Kibana dashboard for the DNP3 communication logs in real-
time. It shows the number of DNP3 packet received over the
defined time interval. Furthermore, it also provides the detailed
information like source IP address, destination IP address,
destination port, function codes, etc. that can also be used
for advanced data analysis. Figure 3 (lower figure) shows
the dashboard of Squil tool, which provides the necessary
access to capture raw data, session data, and real-time events.
It shows alert messages generated from the IDS based on
the defined rules. For developing the NIDS, several set of
rules, belonging to the different stages of chain model, are
implemented in the Snort IDS. Once an anomaly is detected,
the generated alert message is sent to the NSM engine for
providing situational awareness to the control center operator
through alert visualization and notification.
A. Rule-based Intrusion Detection System (RIDS)
We have developed the rule-based IDS around the kill chain
model to effectively detect various attacks. Since our main
objective is to detect different types of attacks, irrespective
of the attacker’s intelligence, we have defined several rules
Fig. 3: Security Onion dashboards (Kibana and Squil) for log
monitoring and alert information.
that are mapped with different stages of the kill chain model
as shown in figure 2. Table 1 shows the detailed information
about IDS rules corresponding to different stages of attacks.
In this table, rule 1 and rule 2 belong to the reconnaissance
(stage 1), rule 3 belongs to the access (stage 2), rule 4 and 5
belong to the launch stage (stage3), and rule 6 falls under the
TABLE I: IDS rules for different stages of attacks
Rules Attack Snort IDS Rules
Rule1 Ping Scanning(Reconnaissance)
Alert icmp $ EXTERNAL NET any -> (IP of your substation RTU) any
(msg:“ICMP to Substation”; content: “| 10 11 12 13 14|” ; sid: 9000547; rev:1;)
Rule 2 Nmap Scanning(Reconnaissance) alert tcp any any -> (IP of your substation RTU) 22 (msg:“NMAP TCP Scan”;sid:10000005; rev:2; )
Rule 3 Telnet Access(Access)
Alert tcp $ EXTERNAL NET any -> (IP of your substation RTU) 23
(msg:“Incoming Telnet” ; content; “root” ; nocase; sid: 9000546; rev:1;)
Rule 4 DOS Attack(launch)
Alert tcp $ EXTERNAL NET any -> (IP of your substation RTU) 20000
(msg:“Warning DoS attack incoming”; threshold:type threshold, track by src, count 100, seconds 5;
sid: 9000547; rev:1;)
Rule 5 Static Malicious Tripping(launch)
Alert tcp !(IP from your control center) any -> (IP of your substation RTU) 20000





Alert tcp (IP from your control center) any -> (IP of your substation RTU) 20000
(msg:“Anomaly detected: 3 relays tripped under 30 sec” ; content :“|00 81|”;
threshold:type threshold, track by src, count 3, seconds 30; sid: 9000547; rev:1;)
category of last stage, persistence (stage 4).
Rule 1: It detects ping scanning on the substation network,
where a remote terminal unit (RTU) is operating. The follow-
ing rule captures the incoming traffic on the specified network
IP address for the ICMP protocol.
Rule 2: This rule generates an alert message whenever an
attacker performs TCP scanning using Nmap on the substation
RTU on port 22.
Rule 3: This rule detects the unauthorized Telnet session
through a root login, which happens at port 23, to the substa-
tion RTU.
Rule 4: This rule detects a denial of service (DoS) attack
on the substation network targeting the DNP3 communication
on port 20000. It generates an alert after the first 100 SYN
packets (SYN flood) during a sampling period of 5 seconds.
Rule 5: This rule detects a static malicious tripping attack,
which is performed through a Man-in-the-Middle (MITM)
attack between the substation RTU and control center. Digital
bond has provided the rule for identifying the specific func-
tion codes [13]. We have extended the rule to whitelist the
legitimate network addresses. In particular, an alert message
is generated whenever the tripping command is coming from
other than the control center network address.
Rule 6: This rule is developed to detect the last stage of
chain model, persistence, where, we have assumed that the
attacker has already created a backdoor access by installing
a malware (Trojan horse) to compromise the control center.
Once the control center is compromised, the attacker performs
multiple malicious tripping attacks by switching off multiple
relays with a motive to shut down the whole power grid. For
this case, the previous mentioned rule will fail to detect this
kind of stealthy coordinated attack as the attack is performed
through the legitimate compromised device. This rule detects
the attack based on the temporal behavior of control signal
DNP3 packets. It computes the timing between three con-
secutive control signal (tripping signal) packets sent from the
control center to the substation. If the computed time is less
than the defined threshold, an alert message is generated. In
this case, we have considered the time threshold to be 30
seconds for tripping three relays. However, the proper tuning
of parameters has to be performed to obtain the minimum
false alarms, especially during the line/relay tripping during
maintenance.
IV. TESTBED DEPLOYMENT AND PERFORMANCE
EVALUATION
A. Testbed Deployment
Figure 4 shows the experimental setup for testing the
SecOn tool in the SCADA cyber-physical environment. In
this work, it is configured on the substation network, where a
remote terminal unit (RTU) is communicating with the control
center through the DNP3 communication. The RTU is mapped
with four physical relays using the IEC 61850 protocol. For
implementing the attack, the installed Kali Linux machine is
listening the network traffic between the control center and
substation network. We have utilized the pre-installed tools,
Nmap, and ping command, in the Kali machine to perform the
attack reconnaissance. The DoS attack is performed by sending
a huge number of random packets to the RTU through the TCP
SYN flooding attack using hping tool. The malicious tripping
attack is performed by listening the network traffic between
the control center and substation through the Wireshark, and
later replaying the captured packets using a python script.
For implementing the coordinated attack for tripping multiple
relays, the control center is compromised by installing a
Trojan horse malware using a flash drive. Once the control
center is compromised, the attacker disables the keyboard and
mouse to take control over the control center; and initiates the
subsequent tripping of relays, similar to 2015 Ukraine’s grid
hack.
B. Performance Evaluation
We have evaluated the performance of RIDS in terms
of accuracy and detection latency. Table 2 shows the high
accuracy rate of six IDS rules, where the rule 1 exhibits an
accurate of 99.8%, and other rules (rule 2 to rule 6) show
an accuracy of 100% during the experimental testing. Figure
5 shows the latency distribution of six defined rules, which
are implemented for detecting different stages of attacks. The
green colored circle in each box plot represents the average
of computed latency. The first two plots (a, b) belong to the
attack reconnaissance, where, the computed latency is smaller
Fig. 4: Experimental setup for Security Onion (SecOn) deployment for the SIEM architecture.




for the ping scanning with an average of 1.6 seconds. The
computed latency is much higher for the nmap scanning with
an average of 14.45 seconds, since it performs deep and inten-
sive scanning for a diverse set of ports, as shown in figure 5
(b). While performing the unauthorized Telnet connection, we
observe a small latency varying from 0.75 seconds (minimum)
to 1.44 seconds (maximum), and its average value is smaller
than the ping scanning latency. During the attack execution,
we have obtained the similar latency for DoS and data integrity
attacks (single malicious tripping). The latency for DoS attack
is uniformly distributed with an average value of around 1.5
seconds. During the single tripping attack, we have performed
two attack scenarios, where, we have varied the volume of
network traffic by connecting one as well as four relays
between the control center and substation as shown in figure
4 (e, f). The latency for the single malicious tripping attack
with 1 relay connected has an average value of 1.35 seconds.
Due to the increased traffic, we have observed a relatively
higher latency with an average of 1.9 seconds during the single
malicious tripping attack with 4 relays connected. Finally, the
multiple tripping attack is performed for the persistence stage,
where 3 physical relays are tripped from the compromised
control center in an interval of 1 seconds. We have successfully
detected the attack with an average value of 3.588 seconds. In
this case, the significant delay is observed due to the additional
delay of 2 seconds while tripping all 3 relays before the IDS
generates an alert message.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS
Security Onion (SecOn) encompasses several features and
pre-installed tools, which can be leveraged to provide the
unique and comprehensive solution in the development, de-
sign, and implementation of the SIEM architecture for the
SCADA cyber-physical security. In this paper, we have il-
lustrated the application of SecOn in developing the Net-
work Security Monitoring (NSM), and rule-based Intrusion
Detection System (RIDS) for the SCADA power system. For
implementing the RIDS, we have deployed several rules using
the Snort IDS tool for detecting cyber attacks and intrusions
based on the cyber kill chain model. Finally, we have evaluated
its performance in terms of accuracy and detection latency.
Based on the real-time experimental analysis, we can conclude
that the RIDS shows a promising performance in detecting
cyber attacks with an accuracy close to 100%. Regarding the
detection latency, our experimental results show that in the
initial stages of kill-chain model, including reconnaissance
and access, the minimum latency is obtained for the Telnet
access, and maximum for the Nmap detection. In the later
stages, including attack launch and persistence, similar latency
is observed for DoS and data integrity attack (malicious
tripping), however, the latency has increased for higher volume
of traffic as well as for the coordinated attack (multiple
relays tripping). In future, we will be working on the IDS
research and development (R&D) to come up with a better
IDS solution.
Fig. 5: Detection latency distribution for different types of attacks.
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